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**European Review**

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**7 August 1985**

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Despite NATO's approval last November, the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) concept is facing persistent criticism inside and outside Allied military establishments and governments, particularly in West Germany. FOFA, which emphasizes use of long-range conventional weapons against Warsaw Pact reinforcements deep in Eastern Europe, is perceived by many West Europeans as a fundamental shift away from NATO's traditional defensive strategy and as a ploy by the United States to sell high-technology weapon systems. The Allies are concerned over the potentially high costs of the program and the likelihood that it would divert scarce resources from strengthening NATO's border defenses—their highest priority.

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**Spain: Tackling the Drug Problem**

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An increase in drug trafficking, drug abuse, and crime during recent years has led to heightened concern among political leaders and the public. The Gonzalez government, criticized in the past for laxity on the problem, has begun to accord it a higher priority, attempting to clarify ambiguities in the law and interdict drug traffickers. Nevertheless, the government's efforts still fall short of an all-out drive to eradicate Spain's problems with drugs.

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**Spain: Security Relations With the West**

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Prime Minister Gonzalez faces serious obstacles in his efforts to strengthen Spain's security relations with the West. Two obstacles are self-made: he has pledged to hold a risky referendum on NATO membership and—in an effort to boost support for NATO—has suggested that continued membership will lead to a reduction in the unpopular US military presence. Although he has the political strength to maintain a pro-Western course, he would like Washington to help him cut his political costs by agreeing to reduce the US presence in talks likely to begin in October.

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*Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as uncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors.*

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## Briefs

## France-Caribbean

## Striking a Deal With ARC [ ]

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Luc Reinette, fugitive leader of the proindependence terrorist group Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC) in the French Antilles, announced recently that he met twice last year with emissaries of the French Government. Reinette claims that French officials are seeking a moratorium on terrorist acts and are willing to negotiate for eventual independence of the islands. Reinette's account has been disputed by one French spokesman, who acknowledged that only a low-level intermediary from Foreign Minister Dumas met with the terrorist leader. [ ]

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French officials have previously tried to work out accommodations with similar groups, and it is possible that they tried to cut a deal with Reinette. It is improbable, however, that Paris would discuss independence in any serious way with a group that represents no more than 2 percent of the Antilles population. Coming at a time when world attention is focusing on ways to combat terrorism, moreover, Reinette's revelations will be particularly embarrassing to the French. Whether the story is true or not, opposition politicians are quick to bludgeon the Socialist government with accusations that France has become a haven for international terrorists. [ ]

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## Canada

## The Politics of Language [ ]

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In late May, the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated all laws passed by the Manitoba legislature since 1890 because they were adopted only in English. When Manitoba entered the Canadian Confederation in 1870, its constitution established both English and French as official languages. In 1890, however, the provincial government made English the official language and all subsequent laws were written only in that tongue. The Court's recent decision requires Manitoba to translate all of its post-1890 statutes into French and keeps them in effect so long as there is reasonable progress toward completing the translations. [ ]

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The Court's decision is both a blessing and a danger for Prime Minister Mulroney's Conservative government. It allows the federal Tories' to show their devotion to bilingualism—the party's opposition to the concept before 1984 denied it significant French Canadian support—by applauding the decision and providing funds to assist translation. Manitoba's current New Democratic Party (NDP) government appears ready to abide by the ruling, but it has at least an even chance of losing to the Tories in the provincial election expected next year. The Manitoba Tories blocked the NDP's compromise language plan last year, forcing the Supreme Court to address the issue. If the Manitoba Tories return to power and slow the pace of translation, Mulroney's government would have to choose between forcing the province to speed completion of the task, thereby alienating its provincial Tory brethren, or tolerating the delay and reviving the federal Conservatives' anti-French reputation. [ ]

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Greece

**Defense Plan Tested** 

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Greece conducted a joint-service exercise in late June reportedly to test its plan to defend against a Turkish invasion. The exercise scenario involved a surprise Turkish airborne and helicopter assault against several Aegean islands accompanied by an armored attack across Evros River into Thrace. Although the General Staff judged Greece's ability to conduct combined operations and air defense in a limited electronic warfare environment as adequate, its preliminary evaluation reportedly revealed a number of shortcomings:

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Cyprus

**Cabinet Reshuffle** 

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President Kyprianou announced a reshuffling of his cabinet on 1 August. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Iacovou, will retain his post and the former Deputy Minister of Interior, Ilias Iliades, will become the Defense Minister. The Minister to the President, Constantinos Michaelides, will take over the Ministry of Interior and the former Communications Minister, Christos Mavrellis, will replace the recently resigned Finance Minister

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The cabinet reshuffle is a minor one involving primarily a shifting of posts and a few new faces. It is unlikely to portend any change in policies. President Kyprianou probably is responding to a demand by the legislature, which he is contesting in the Supreme Court, that he reduce the number of ministries and abolish the Ministry of the Presidency. In the event that the Supreme Court upholds the ruling, Kyprianou's cabinet reshuffle will allow him to retain his close adviser Michaelides.

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**Eastern Europe****Western Bankers Return** 

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Eastern Europe is experiencing a resurgence in lending from Western commercial banks on a scale approaching that of the late 1970s. Syndicated credits to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary have totaled nearly \$2.5 billion so far in 1985—compared with \$3 billion in 1982-84—and have carried favorable terms. Competition among lenders seems to be due more to high liquidity and a lack of better loan opportunities elsewhere than to confidence in East European economic prospects. Economically troubled Poland and Yugoslavia, however, are still shut out of the syndicated loan market, and a current loan effort for Romania faces uncertain prospects.

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The current upsurge in bank lending probably has halted—but not reversed—the 1981-84 trend when the share of East European debt owed to commercial banks shrank from 79 percent to 53 percent, while debt owed to Western governments, the IMF, and the World Bank has increased. The East Europeans apparently are using new bank credits largely to refinance existing commercial debt on better terms rather than to cover payments deficits. Their official debt is likely to continue rising because most Western governments seem willing to extend more credits to support trade, and the East Europeans appear ready to begin importing more capital goods typically financed with these loans. The combined obligations of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary to the IMF should begin to fall this year; but, if Poland joins the IMF in 1986, as planned, East European debt to the Fund could begin growing rapidly again.

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**Czechoslovakia****Drugs Scandal** 

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The head of Czechoslovak customs has been jailed for 10 years for “illegal enrichment” and nearly 300 customs officers serving along the borders with East and West Germany and Austria have been arrested or transferred for taking bribes from international drug smugglers earlier this year. In one of the most serious postwar corruption scandals, the smugglers reportedly transported the drugs, mostly heroin, from Beirut across Czechoslovakia to West Berlin, the Netherlands, and possibly Austria.

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Given the growing use of drugs among Czechoslovak youth, some of the drugs may have been diverted inside Czechoslovakia. Last May the West German press reported that several employees of a Czechoslovak pharmaceutical company had been arrested for selling drugs to local addicts. Neither story has been reported in the Czechoslovak media, which occasionally publish such items to discourage drug use, suggesting that the scandal might have reached too high in the system for public disclosure.

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## NATO: Going Slow on Upgrading Conventional Deep-Strike Capabilities

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Despite NATO approval last November, the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept is facing persistent criticism inside and outside Allied military establishments and governments, particularly in West Germany. FOFA, which emphasizes use of long-range conventional weapons against Warsaw Pact reinforcements deep in Eastern Europe, is perceived by many West Europeans as a fundamental shift away from NATO's traditional defensive strategy and as a ploy by the United States to sell high-technology weapon systems. The Allies are concerned over the potentially high costs of the program and the likelihood that it would divert scarce resources from strengthening NATO's border defenses—their highest priority. They also question the feasibility of attacking mobile targets at long ranges. As a result, we believe that Allied implementation of the program will be slow and probably emphasize relatively short-range systems.

### Political Concerns

With its emphasis on deep strikes, FOFA is perceived by many West Europeans as destabilizing because they believe it could cause a new arms race and damage both detente and the arms control process. Leading European defense experts such as Johan Jorgen Holst, director of Norway's Institute of International Affairs, have questioned whether FOFA is consistent with a political strategy aimed at increasing confidence and cooperation across the borders. He and other Europeans have also noted that many of the conventional strike systems envisioned under FOFA could carry nuclear warheads, thus blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, complicating strategic as well as conventional arms control talks, and increasing the risk of unintentional escalation in wartime.

In the view of many West Europeans, FOFA also undermines the defensive nature of NATO strategy and wrongly emphasizes the waging of war rather than its prevention. The West Germans have been particularly sensitive about enhancing NATO's ability to "flatten" Poland—as put by Peter Glotz,

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### FOFA: The Whys and Wherefores

*Improving the capability to attack follow-on forces is one of several initiatives approved in recent years as part of a special effort by NATO to strengthen its conventional defenses. The decision to concentrate on conventional forces results from several factors: Allied perceptions of a worsening balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces; the desire by Allied governments to reassure their publics—particularly in light of the decision to deploy INF missiles—that NATO's Flexible Response strategy is not overly dependent on the early use of nuclear weapons; and the realization that "emerging" technologies could play a significant role in NATO's conventional modernization efforts.*

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*FOFA is one of several related concepts that aim to offset the numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact forces by utilizing these new technologies. The concept is consistent with NATO's strategy of Flexible Response and attempts to increase the chances that NATO's forward defense will be successful:*

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- *It envisions the use of conventional weapons only, with emphasis on surface-to-surface missiles and long-range air-launched "smart" weapons, to attack targets such as troop concentrations, supply convoys, and transportation choke points.*
  - *The concept makes no provisions for either preemptive strikes by NATO before an attack or a NATO ground offensive into Warsaw Pact territory.*
  - *It is consistent with NATO's longstanding air doctrine that includes interdiction of Warsaw Pact follow-on forces. By using advanced technology, however, FOFA seeks to enable NATO to accomplish the interdiction mission more effectively and with systems other than manned aircraft.*
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secretary general of the Social Democratic Party (SPD)—using West Germany as a base. According to press reporting, some Europeans worry that “raising the nuclear threshold” by improving conventional defenses would lower the risks of war to the Soviets and could decouple US and European security interests. In their view, strong conventional forces on NATO’s side could lead to a prolonged conventional conflict in which Europe could be devastated while the North America landmass escaped unscathed.

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Coupled with these concerns are traditional West European suspicions regarding US motives for proposing programs that would rely heavily on the high-technology market dominated by the United States. According to the US Mission to NATO, many Europeans perceive the United States as developing the hardware first and contriving the conceptual basis for its use later. Dr. Peter Volten, director of policy affairs in the Dutch Ministry of Defense, also has questioned the wisdom of relying heavily on technology to compensate for the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact. While he noted the contribution technology could make to combat capabilities, he opposed concentrating on a technological “solution” at the expense of such intangible, but critical, factors as mobility and maneuver.

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#### **Military Criticisms**

Militarily, all European NATO nations—as stressed by West Germany during the meeting of NATO defense ministers in May—consider defending the immediate border areas their highest priority. Although the Allies generally agree that reducing the threat from reinforcing or “second-echelon” forces is desirable, they subordinate this goal to the overall forward defense mission.

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[REDACTED] the Allies prefer to think of FOFA in terms of striking nearby forces about to be committed to the frontline battle rather than those located up to 500 kilometers away as envisioned by US planners

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The technical feasibility of deep strikes against mobile targets also has long been questioned by many defense experts and is currently under review by NATO

working groups.

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. They concluded that long-range attack of mobile targets by systems other than manned aircraft is not feasible in the near term and that NATO has insufficient aircraft to carry out FOFA in addition to other key defensive missions. Moreover, NATO aircraft would be vulnerable to Warsaw Pact air defenses and their armament only marginally effective against the majority of FOFA targets.

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There are also uncertainties regarding the ability of future systems to attack distant mobile targets effectively. According to the preliminary judgments of NATO working groups studying FOFA, future aircraft and weapon systems will be more effective than those now available, but there will be conflicting requirements for their use and they will only marginally improve NATO’s ability to impede follow-on forces. The primary gaps will be accurately locating forces more than 100 kilometers from the frontlines and effectively striking forces more than 200 kilometers away with systems other than manned aircraft. Even at shorter ranges, according to these studies, adequate coverage of all avenues of approach would not be possible because only limited numbers of new systems would likely be procured.

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A final criticism of FOFA from a military perspective concerns its applicability to current Soviet offensive strategy. Many European defense experts question whether the USSR would use the large second-echelon formations that would be targeted under FOFA. They argue that the threat of a NATO nuclear strike prevents large units from concentrating for long periods and that the Soviets are emphasizing mobility. In their view, rather than using successive waves of forces to wear out NATO defenses, the Soviets would concentrate their forces in a single attack echelon and rely on maneuver to penetrate NATO defenses. They further note that, in any case, the Soviets likely would respond to any new operational concept such as FOFA by developing the tactics and weapon systems to defeat it.

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**Economic Constraints**

Because of FOFA's emphasis on the use of emerging technologies, most Europeans believe it will carry high long-term economic costs. According to some estimates, FOFA could be funded by raising the annual increase in Allied defense budgets from the current 3-percent guideline to 4 percent. Given current economic conditions throughout Western Europe, however, nearly all Allies have had difficulty in meeting even the 3-percent goal—averaging less than 2 percent in the seven years since the guideline was adopted—and all are opposed to committing additional resources to a program whose merits they consider dubious. Instead, they apparently intend to concentrate on improving forward defense capabilities to strengthen conventional defenses within existing resource constraints. In their view, FOFA systems would only be cost-effective if they could also be used against the close-in threat. [ ]

The technological uncertainties and economic and political constraints facing nearly all NATO nations make it unlikely that the Allies will be willing to devote substantial resources to most FOFA-related projects, particularly those involving long-range systems. Instead, we believe the Allies will continue to concentrate on more traditional force goals such as improving their defensive capabilities close to the front, which could ultimately include the development of a limited short-range FOFA capability. Such an approach would be consistent with their desire to limit both the economic costs of new systems and the negative political fallout of deploying additional deep-strike weapons. At the same time, the Allies probably will look to the US military to cover most longer range requirements for follow-on forces attack. [ ]

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Many West Europeans even doubt these estimates are a realistic assessment of FOFA's likely costs. The West German periodical *Der Spiegel*, for example, has noted that the cost of complex weapon systems relying heavily on electronics has historically been underestimated. Deep-strike weapons in particular have been disproportionately more expensive than shorter range systems. [ ]

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**Outlook**

Progress on improving NATO's ability to attack follow-on forces at long range is likely to be slow, as NATO nations grapple with defining future needs and determining how best to allocate scarce resources. The Allies continue to stress that an agreed conceptual military framework is needed that establishes priorities among high-technology programs such as FOFA and puts these needs in the proper political and economic context. Even with a NATO-agreed framework, however, spending decisions relating to specific programs such as FOFA will ultimately rest with individual nations. [ ]

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## Spain: Tackling the Drug Problem

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An increase in drug trafficking, drug abuse, and crime during recent years has led to heightened concern among political leaders and the public. The Gonzalez government, criticized in the past for laxity on the problem, has begun to accord it a higher priority, attempting to clarify ambiguities in the law and interdict drug traffickers. Nevertheless, the government's efforts still fall short of an all-out drive to eradicate Spain's problems with drugs.

### The Problem

Both Spanish and US officials acknowledge that Spain has served increasingly in the last few years as a transshipment point for illicit drugs destined for European and North American markets. Spanish officials claim that there has been a 50-percent increase in seizures of cocaine and heroin over the past two years. In 1984 alone, more than 1,200 kilograms of cocaine were seized, and heroin seizures in the first six months of 1984 reached more than 100 kilos, compared with seizures counted in grams 10 years ago.

A Spanish medical study published in April revealed that nearly 4 million Spaniards, or 10 percent of the population, are either drug addicts or frequently use stimulants. According to a magazine report, between 100,000 and 200,000 Spaniards are addicts, compared to 1,300 addicts in 1971. Political opponents blame the Socialists for the recent increases because it was Gonzalez's government that eased the legal barriers to narcotics possession.

### Socialist Policy

During the Franco regime, the conservative government took a tough stand on drug abuse and trafficking. After the Socialist government was elected in 1982, it passed legislation to decriminalize the use of marijuana and "humanize" the penal code. As of July 1983 possession of "soft" drugs for personal use was no longer a crime, and laws relating to preventive detention and probationary release were relaxed. The legislation states that it is illegal to

cultivate, manufacture, or traffic in drugs or to possess these substances for such purposes, but it does not distinguish between amounts that can be held for "personal use" and amounts that constitute "trafficking." This determination is made on an individual basis by the presiding magistrate as cases are brought before the court. The rapid increase in drug use and drug trafficking following passage of this legislation alarmed the public and put pressure on the government to counter the drug explosion.

Between 1983 and the first half of 1984, the government committed additional resources for enforcement activities and for prevention and treatment programs. Nevertheless, policymakers continued to give the drug problem a lower priority than other issues such as the threat posed by separatist political groups. The interdiction of drugs remained only a moderate priority for the National Police and the Guardia Civil and, according to Embassy reporting, the two forces persistently failed to coordinate their efforts. Spain did increase cooperation against traffickers with neighboring European countries

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### New Course

By mid-1984, pressure had grown so strong from both the Spanish public and foreign governments that the government launched a major antidrug campaign. The Socialists asked the legislature to clarify some of the confusing aspects of the 1983 legislation. In addition, the government named a special federal prosecutor for drug matters and established an interministerial antidrug agency that includes the Ministers of Health, Justice, and Interior. The government also launched publicity campaigns warning Spaniards of the effects of drug abuse.

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This year the government is continuing to bolster its antidrug campaign. It has upheld or strengthened bilateral and multilateral agreements and increased border controls, resulting in increased drug seizures. According to US officials, however, the Spanish Government is unwilling to initiate the stringent customs and border controls needed to combat this problem out of fear that such measures will intimidate the 43 million tourists who visit Spain each year. Nevertheless, although Madrid lacks the money and trained personnel needed for a much larger effort, the increased publicity given to the drug problem—and public insistence on a government solution—probably ensure that the Socialists will continue to look for additional means of dealing with the issue.

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## Spain: Security Relations With the West

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Prime Minister Gonzalez faces serious obstacles in his efforts to strengthen Spain's security relations with the West. Two obstacles are self-made: he has pledged to hold a risky referendum on NATO membership and, in an effort to boost support for NATO, has suggested that continued membership will lead to a reduction in the unpopular US military presence. Although he has the political strength to maintain a pro-Western course, he would like Washington to help him cut his political costs by agreeing to reduce the US presence in talks likely to begin in October.

### Pro-Western Goals

Gonzalez's primary foreign policy goal is to end his country's isolation and move it into the European mainstream. He understood that Spain could not achieve EC membership unless it was willing to accept military partnership by remaining in NATO and continuing to host the US military presence.

In general, US security cooperation has proceeded more smoothly under him than under his center-right predecessors. Soon after entering office, he obtained parliamentary approval for a new agreement with Washington. Similarly, he came out publicly in favor of continued NATO membership last fall and has recently raised the possibility of military integration as well.

### The NATO Referendum

Gonzalez has had to contend with wide opposition to his pro-Western steps. His problems have been aggravated because he played to these sentiments in his 1982 election campaign with a promise to hold a referendum on NATO membership. He has repeatedly reaffirmed that promise in order to reduce opposition from the left to his foreign policy course. Earlier this year he pledged to hold the referendum by next spring.

Gonzalez is under pressure to honor that promise. Polls show that voters expect him to keep his word, and his failure to fulfill his other principal campaign

pledge—to create more jobs—probably adds to his reluctance to defy public opinion. Moreover, his own frequently demonstrated pride, confidence in his ability to sway public opinion, and willingness to gamble probably also incline him to risk a referendum.

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Nevertheless, the outcome of the referendum remains dubious. Polls show 2-to-1 opposition to NATO. The greatest change since Gonzalez took office has been toward a hardening of opinion on both sides—the number of undecided voters has declined, NATO supporters have become more enthusiastic about full integration, and opponents have grown more opposed.

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Gonzalez appears to have his own doubts. Although US officials have periodically received reports of plans for a public relations campaign on behalf of NATO, he has repeatedly shrunk from kicking off that effort. This past May, Gonzalez cited "scheduling difficulties" in postponing publication of the referendum proposition.

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Although Gonzalez is reluctant to abandon the referendum pledge, he has sought to reduce the importance of that vote. Recently, he declared that a small turnout would not be binding. He also told a local Socialist meeting that he was determined to keep Spain in NATO and, in case of an adverse referendum vote, would call a snap election and include continued membership in his platform.

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### Kicking a Sleeping Dog: The US Military Presence Becomes an Issue

Gonzalez appears aware that staying in NATO will cost him politically. He wants Washington to foot part of that bill by agreeing to reduce the US military presence. Last October he suggested that continued

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NATO membership would permit reduction in the US presence. Until then, the issue had been a "sleeper." Polls showed wide opposition to US forces in Spain, but few voters thought about it unless asked and, even then, their opposition did not run deep.

Despite initial reluctance to press the issue—presumably for fear of raising unmeetable expectations—Gonzalez evidently has decided that linkage is his best option. He raised the issue during the President's visit to Madrid in May and agreed to general discussions on Spain's contribution to Western security arrangements followed by negotiations on the US presence.

Madrid now seems intent on speeding the leisurely pace of negotiations foreseen in this understanding. Spanish officials have told their US counterparts they must soon begin negotiations on US basis in order to improve the chances of winning a referendum.

This assessment may be accurate—almost certainly the Spanish believe it. Even if Gonzalez backs out of the referendum, Spain's interest in the US presence is unlikely to abate. Indeed, Gonzalez might even believe that he had all the more need to negotiate a reduction in order to lessen leftist disappointment.

#### **Spain's Likely Approach to Negotiations**

Regardless of Gonzalez's decision on the referendum, the Spanish almost certainly will talk tough in the security talks.

Moreover, even supporters of close ties to Washington in the Spanish military believe that the United States has failed to live up to its pledge of "best efforts" under the bilateral agreement, and they have been particularly disappointed at what they regard as Washington's failure to help complete the Combat Grande early warning system.

Spanish leaders have already told US officials they do not believe Washington needs as much access to Spanish territory as it now enjoys. Spanish negotiators are likely to press hard for a US pullback from Torrejon Airbase—only 19 kilometers from Madrid.

Torrejon has become the target of leftist demonstrators, who claim that US access to that facility has made Madrid a bull's eye on a Soviet missile launcher's map. Radicals also argue that Torrejon symbolizes Gonzalez's inability to break with the subservience of previous Spanish governments to Washington. Even in the Franco era, Spanish negotiators pressed to reduce the US presence at Torrejon in base negotiations. We believe that the growing chorus of leftist agitation will reinforce Gonzalez's inclination to push the issue.

The Spanish almost certainly see themselves in a strong bargaining position. The only item on the agenda is US "give backs," and they may believe that they can obtain reductions in the US presence without significant cuts in US aid. They might make some accommodations, but they are likely to press for maximum benefit in return. For example, the Spanish might agree to a redeployment of US forces to southern Spain or Valladolid, but would almost certainly argue that, if facilities in Spain are as important as Washington says, then the United States should pay for that move.

There is some danger, however, that the Spanish may miscalculate. Gonzalez already has demonstrated—on both the NATO referendum and the base issue—that he is capable of creating problems where none need have existed. There is always the possibility that he will repeat this performance and announce excessively tough demands that would be difficult to retreat from. However, he is an intelligent man who is capable of learning from his mistakes, and we believe he has come to regard the referendum as a mistake.

#### **Moderating Influences in Madrid**

A number of factors suggest the Spanish will try to avoid damaging relations with the United States. Even in opposition his party had at least nominally supported US use of Spanish facilities. Spanish military chiefs, for their part, recognize that US maintenance of Spanish bases eases the Spanish

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military budget. Gonzalez also knows that a falling out with Washington would worry centrist voters whom he has tried to convince of his moderation.

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Spanish leaders, moreover, have expressed interest in greater defense-industrial cooperation. Although Gonzalez was slow to respond to US pressure on export control, his interest in acquiring high technology from the United States led him recently to come out in favor of COCOM membership.

Top Spanish officials have also assured US officials that any reductions in the US presence would be by mutual agreement and more "cosmetic" than substantive. The United States should also benefit from Gonzalez's decision in July to install the unambiguously pro-Western Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez as Foreign Minister in place of the more independent-minded Fernando Moran.

Overall, Gonzalez appears likely to settle for changes that give the appearance of a Spanish victory but leave Washington with what it needs in Spain. A Spanish official has already hinted that reducing the authorized US troop ceiling by about 10 percent to the actual current level would help Gonzalez without—in his view—damaging Western security. The Spanish might also be receptive to relabeling some US-used facilities as NATO operations. Polls indicate this would lessen opposition to the US presence.

#### **Gonzalez's Political Strength**

Gonzalez has the political strength to keep Spain in NATO without jeopardizing eventual integration or a strong US military presence. Leftists unhappy with Gonzalez's policies have few places to go. Infighting among the Communists—his principal rival on the left—has badly damaged their image with the voters. The divided Communists may run three separate slates of candidates in the next election and are not likely to get much more than 5 percent of the vote. The parties to Gonzalez's right are also badly divided, and are—besides—even more unabashedly pro-Western than Gonzalez's party.

Gonzalez must know as well that voters care most about domestic issues. Whatever course he adopts on NATO and the US presence probably will recede as a public concern once election campaigning begins no later than the end of 1986. Indeed, neither Gonzalez's recent statements on NATO military integration and COCOM nor press speculation that he might abandon the referendum have dented his popularity. Polls, in fact, show Gonzalez still is a heavy favorite to win reelection, and even stands a good chance of obtaining another absolute parliamentary majority. That solid political base means that, as much as Gonzalez might welcome large concessions from Washington, he can probably manage with minor changes. As long as his pride is not affronted and he does not lose face publicly, we believe he would settle for that and continue his efforts to make Spain a strong US and NATO ally.

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